Bibliografia (Artículos doctrinales)

-«Imperatividad de la norma de conflicto y prueba del Derecho extranjero en los Reglamentos sobre ley aplicable a las situaciones privadas internacionales»
Patricia OREJUDO PRIETO DE LOS MOZOS, Profesora Titular de Derecho Internacional Privado (Universidad Complutense de Madrid)
en X. Abel Lluch, J. Picó i Junoy, M. Richard González (Dirs.), La prueba judicial. Desafíos en las jurisdicciones civil, penal, laboral y contencioso-administrativa, Editorial La Ley, Madrid, 2010, pp. 477-498.

Sumario: 1.- Aplicación de la norma de conflicto y aplicación del Derecho extranjero en los sistemas procesales estatales: el ejemplo español 1.1. Imperatividad de la norma de conflicto (con carácter general) 1.2. Desconocimiento de la imperatividad en la jurisprudencia española 1.3. Posibilidades de aplicación de oficio del Derecho extranjero 2.- Las normas de conflicto institucionales 2.1. Imperatividad de los reglamentos sobre ley aplicable (en particular) 2.2. Aplicación de la ley extranjera elegida por las partes 2.3. Alcance de la unificación conflictual: admisibilidad de divergencias en los sistemas estatales 3.- Conclusiones

Habida cuenta de las características que revisten los reglamentos europeos, así como de los objetivos que persiguen, la aplicación de las normas de conflicto que contienen ha de considerarse imperativa, también en los Estados miembros cuyo DIPr (de iure o de facto) acoge un sistema conflictual facultativo. En consecuencia, la aplicación del Derecho extranjero reclamado por las normas de conflicto institucionales ha de realizarse de oficio por las autoridades de los Estados miembros, aunque tal posibilidad no esté prevista en el Derecho procesal interno del foro. Y esta obligación de la autoridad de actuar de oficio no puede relajarse aunque la ley aplicada haya sido elegida por las partes, salvo que el legislador institucional así lo disponga de forma expresa. Aunque no quepa otra interpretación de las normas institucionales, de manera que, en puridad, no sea preciso advertir expresamente acerca de la referida imperatividad, ni de la obligación de aplicación de la ley extranjera ex officio, quizás convenga introducir una norma específica en los instrumentos institucionales, para despejar cualquier duda al efecto. Finalmente, pueden quedar en manos de los ordenamientos procesales estatales cuestiones tales como la posibilidad de prescindir de la prueba de la ley extranjera, o la regulación de los medios de prueba admisibles y su fuerza probatoria. Pero resulta necesario dotar de una normativa específica a un aspecto que los Derechos estatales abordan de forma muy dispar, que es la ley que resulta de aplicación cuando la autoridad se encuentre ante la imposibilidad material o legal de aplicar el Derecho extranjero reclamado en un principio por la norma de conflicto.

-Recognition in spain of Parentage Created by Surrogate Motherhood
Patricia OREJUDO PRIETO DE LOS MOZOS, PhD, Tenured Lecturer in Private International Law (Complutense University of Madrid)
Yearbook of Private International Law, Volume 12 (2010), pp. 619-637

Summary: I. Introductory remarks A. Surrogate motherhood and reproductive tourism B. Legal situation in Spain II. Legal treatment of the matter before the civil status registers: doctrine of the DGRN A. Methodological issues B. Incidental recognition of the foreign judgment III. Legal treatment of the matter before the courts A. Review of the registration: JPI num. 15 of Valencia of 15 September 2010 B. Principal recognition of the foreign judgment: forum shopping and public policy C. Supranational protection of fundamental rights: ECHR doctrine in Wagner c. Luxembourg IV. Conclusion

Gay couples have complained before the Spanish Government about the different treatment that the entry in the Spanish civil status registers of the birth in a foreign country of children born out of a surrogate mother receives, depending on the sex of the intended parents. In fact, when they are a man and a woman in a procreative age, nothing makes the register authority to suspect that the practice has taken place, and the registration is granted. However, when the intended parents are two men, surrogacy is made evident and the registration is denied. In order to solve this factual (rather than legal) discrimination, the DGRN (which is an administrative body dependent from the Ministry of Justice) could have asked the civil register authorities to reinforce the corroboration of the veracity of the registered facts, so as to avoid that the parent-child relationship enters the civil status registers as a result of the ignorance of reality, i.e., as if the practice had not occurred. But, on the contrary, the DGRN has dictated some instructions, according to which the authorities in charge of the civil status registers might grant the entry of the births, upon recognition of the (compulsory) foreign judgment that created the parent-child relationship. As a result of this political response, the DGRN has left a scenario of legal uncertainty. Should a civil status register authority follow the doctrine of the DGRN and therefore deny the entry because there is no judgment, there would be no practical inconvenient: Spanish courts could uphold the appeal against the dismissal on procedural grounds, but they would not order the registration, as there are other reasons to refuse the recognition of the parent-child relationship. But if a foreign ruling is submitted with the application, the entry could be granted after its automatic recognition according to the specific requirements provided for by such doctrine. In this case, if an appeal before the Spanish courts is lodged, it is very probable that they would cancel the registration, since they would take into account different requirements for recognition of the foreign ruling. In particular, it is very likely that they consider that the intended parents have committed fraudulent forum shopping when they resorted to the foreign courts, and that the recognition is contrary to the Spanish public policy. The actual situation shows the opportunity of rethinking the reasons to uphold the ban in Spain. If these reasons are still valid, surrogate motherhood is to be considered contrary to Spanish public policy, and the recognition of the parental relationship created by means of this practice is to be granted only by means of the attenuation or relativization of the exception. To this respect, only the doctrine of the ECHR in Case Wagner v. Luxembourg could oblige the courts to the recognition of the parentage. But if these reasons are not longer convincing, it is time for the law-maker to act. A new Spanish law on the ART should be enacted, so as to regulate the practice in Spain, and the requirements for the recognition of its legal consequences, when fulfilled abroad.